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AUTHORITY FOR FILING BRIEF BY AMICUS CURIAE 
Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, dated March 21, 2003, and the Order of the 
Utah Supreme Court, dated April 4, 2003, the Utah Association of Counties ("UAC") 
submits the following brief as amicus curiae, in accordance with the provision of UTAH 
R. APP. P. 25. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
UAC files this brief as amicus curiae solely on the issue of whether the taxpayer 
is entitled to the benefit of a "tie" when four Commissioners of the Utah State Tax 
Commission (the "Commission") do not vote in the taxpayer's favor by a majority of 
three. The instant appeal arises in the context of whether a taxpayer is due a refund 
based on a determination of the correct point of valuation for purposes of imposition of 
severance tax under UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-102(1 )(a). This Court's ruling with respect 
to UTAH ADMIN. R. R861-1A-21 ("Rule 21") will have an impact far beyond the specific 
issues presented here. In effect, the taxpayer here ("Exxonmobil") seeks to substitute 
the opinion of each individual taxpayer as to the meaning of statutory terms, in any 
case where the full Commission cannot reach a majority decision. Public policy 
considerations mandate that this Court reject that conclusion. 
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RELEVANT STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1-205. Chairman - Quorum - Sessions. 
The Governor shall designate one of the members of the 
commission as chairperson. Three members of the commission 
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. The 
commission shall be in session and open for the transaction of 
business during ordinary business hours each day. The 
commission may hold sessions or conduct investigations at any 
place in the state to facilitate the performance of its duties. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1-610: 
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings 
commenced before the commission, the Court of Appeals or 
Supreme Court shall: 
(a) grant the commission deference 
concerning its written findings of fact, applying a 
substantial evidence standard on review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference 
concerning its conclusions of law, applying a 
correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit 
grant of discretion contained in a statute at issue 
before the appellate court. 
(2) This section supercedes Section 63-46b-16 
pertaining to judicial review of formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
Commission Rule R861-1A-21. Rulings by the Commission Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Section 59-1-205. 
A. A quorum of the commission must participate in any 
order which constitutes final agency action on an adjudicative 
matter. 
B. The party charged with the burden of proof or the 
burden of overcoming a statutory presumption shall prevail only if a 
majority of the participating commissioners rules in that party's 
2 
favor. 
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, § 2(1): 
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws 
of the United States, or under this Constitution, shall be 
taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value, 
to be ascertained as provided by law. 
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, § 3(1): 
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal 
rate of assessment on all tangible property in the state, 
according to its value in money, except as otherwise 
provided in Section 2 of this Article. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this case, the taxpayer, Exxonmobil, determined that, based on its own 
interpretation of the severance tax statute, it had overpaid its severance tax and it 
requested a refund. It requested a refund of the taxes it alleged it had overpaid and the 
Division, in the exercise of its statutory duties as the original assessing authority, issued 
its Statutory Notice, in which it denied Exxonmobil's request for refund. 
Exxonmobil argues that, despite the fact that it failed to persuade a majority of 
the Commissioners, as required for it to prevail by UTAH ADMIN. R. R861-1A-21(B) 
("Rule 21"), it should, nevertheless, have been held to have prevailed. That holding 
would effectively eliminate the presumption that the Division or any other duly 
constituted taxing authority, in the performance of its constitutionally and statutorily 
appointed duties, is presumed to have acted appropriately and that the burden is upon 
the taxpayer or other party challenging that action to persuade the Commission that an 
3 
error has been made. 
It is that presumption that is encompassed within Rule 21. In this brief, UAC will 
demonstrate that Rule 21 is in harmony with the scheme of taxation, as established by 
the Utah Constitution, Utah law implementing the constitutional mandate and 
precedents established by this Court. Rule 21 correctly interprets the intent of the 
Legislature to ensure that a fair taxis imposed on all tangible taxable property. The 
state of the law, both here and in other jurisdictions, favors the Commission's ruling with 
respect to Rule 21. Further, should the Court Rule 21, the result may imperil the fiscal 
stability of county governments. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. BOTH THE STATUTORY SCHEME OF TAXATION A N D EXISTING PRECEDENT 
SUPPORT THE HOLDING OF THE COMMISSION A N D RULE 21 . 
Before the specific provisions of the tax statutes are discussed, reference should 
be made to the provisions of the Utah Constitution, from which the authority to enact 
the statutes flows. Article XIII, § 2 of the Utah Constitution mandates that all tangible 
property in the state shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate, unless exempt under 
the laws of the United States, or under the Utah Constitution. Article XIII, § 3 of the 
Utah Constitution requires the Legislature to provide a uniform and equal rate of 
assessment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money,". . . as 
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such property, so that every person and 
corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property." 
The Utah Tax Commission "shall administer and supervise the tax laws of the 
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State." Utah Constitution, Article XIII, § 11 (3)(a). The Commission is empowered, inter 
alia, to "adopt rules and policies consistent with the Constitution and laws of this state 
to govern the commission . . . in the performance of their duties" (UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-
1-210(2)); "to administer and supervise the tax laws of the state" (UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-
1-210(5)); "to carefully examine all cases where evasion or violation of the laws for 
assessment and taxation of property is alleged, to ascertain whether existing laws are 
defective or improperly administered" (UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1-210(20)); "to perform any 
further duties imposed by law, and exercise all powers necessary in the performance of 
its duties" (UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1-210(25); and "to comply with the procedures and 
requirements of Title 63,Chapter 46b, in its adjudicative proceedings" (UTAH CODE ANN. 
§59-1-210(27)). 
The Utah Constitution divides original assessment responsibilities between the 
State Tax Commission, through its Property Tax Division, and the various counties, 
municipalities, local school districts, and special districts in the state. Relative to the 
severance tax at issue here, the Commission, through its Property Tax Division, has 
original assessment authority. See generally UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-5-1. et seq. 
Thus, the State Tax Commission has more than mere administrative duties; it is 
also clothed with quasi-judicial duties and functions and is subject to judicial review of 
its decisions when a decision, ruling or order materially affects the substantial rights of 
the applicant for the writ, and results in a wrong interpretation of the law or a failure to 
follow or apply the law, or is against the undisputed evidence. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 
59-1-301,-1-401,-1-501,-2-1007, -7-517, -10-533, -12-114, -13-210, 63-46b-3, and 
UTAH ADMIN R. R861-1 A-20(3). 
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A. The Determinations Of The Taxing Authorities Are Presumed To Be 
Correct-
In any administrative or judicial action in which a taxpayer challenges the initial 
determination of the taxing authorities, the original determination shall be presumed 
correct if the determination was made in accordance with the agency policy and the 
law. See, e.g., Trailer Train Co. v. State Board of Education, 180 Cal.App.3d 565, 584 
(1986) ("Courts have long presumed that the Board assess all property correctly, 
placing on the taxpayer the burden of proving that an assessment is incorrect."); 
Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla. 1978) (holding that tax assessors are 
constitutional officers whose actions are clothed with the presumption of correctness.); 
Powell v. Kelly, 223 So.2d 305, 308 (Fla. 1969) (In order to overcome the presumption 
of correctness, a taxpayer must present proof that the tax assessor departed from the 
requirements of the law or that the assessment was not supported by any reasonable 
hypothesis of legality.); Benson v. Town ofLe Claire, 170 N.W. 747, 748 (Iowa 1919) 
("Presumptively, the value fixed by the board of equalization is equitable, and the 
burden rested upon appellant to overcome this presumption.") The Division's 
assessment, as the value determination of the original assessing authority, is thus 
entitled to a presumption of correctness. 
The presumption of correctness was briefly discussed in Hercules, Inc. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 877 P.2d 169 (Utah 1994): 
Our review of the record reveals only one instance in which 
a presumption of correctness was raised. After Hercules 
presented its case to the Commission, Mr. Peters requested 
the Commission to dismiss the case for failure of proof. 
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During this colloquy, Mr. Peters stated that Hercules "has 
failed in its proof to overcome, first of all, the presumption of 
the validity of the initial assessment by the Salt Lake County 
Assessor's office." Importantly, Mr. Peters was referring to 
the initial assessment and not to Mr. Kent's subsequent 
appraisal, which Hercules claims was given a presumption 
of correctness by the Commission. We believe it was 
entirely proper for Mr. Peters to raise this issue. Hercules's 
assessment had been upheld by the Board; accordingly, the 
initial assessment should have been afforded a 
presumption of correctness in the hearing before the 
Commission. 
Id. at 172 (emphasis added). Because the Statutory Notice of the Division was given to 
Exxonmobil in the ordinary course of the performance of the Division's statutory duties, 
it, too, is entitled to the presumption of correctness. 
B. The Taxpayer Bears The Initial Burden Of Proof To Overcome The 
Presumption of Correctness Accorded Determinations Of The Taxing 
Authorities. 
The taxpayer, or other challenging party, has the burden of overcoming the 
presumption of correctness accorded the original assessing authority. This burden of 
proof is a logical and necessary component of the presumption of correctness to which 
property appraisers, as constitutional officers, are entitled and is not a departure from 
any established administrative, judicial, statutory or constitutional mandate. 
It is well established that the burden of proof rests on the party who asserts the 
affirmative of an issue. Maxwell Land Grant Co. v. Dawson, 151 U.S. 586, 604 (1898) 
("Ordinarily the burden of proof is upon the party claiming the affirmative of the issue."). 
Simply because the issue involved is the amount of a tax, that burden is not eliminated 
or lessened. See Deseret Pharmaceuticals Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 579 P.2d 1322, 
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1327 (Utah 1978) (imposing the burden of proof of a party seeking relief under the 
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act); Hercules, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
877 P.2d at 172 (Utah 1994) (holding that the burden of proof falls upon party seeking 
affirmative relief in ad valorem tax cases and that burden is satisfied by preponderance 
of evidence). 
C. The Taxpayer Who Fails To Meet Its Burden Of Proof Does Not 
Prevail. 
The core of Exxonmobil's argument on appeal is that, because four 
Commissioners participated in the decision and no majority decision was reached, 
Exxonmobil is entitled to prevail because the "act" of less than a majority of the 
Commission is not a valid act of the Commission. This argument is without merit. 
The Utah Supreme Court in £.C. Olson Co. v. State Tax Commission, 168 P. 2d 
324, 328 (Utah 1946), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is our opinion that when the legislature used the word "quorum" in 
reference to the Tax Commission it intended that when a quorum of 
the Commission is present a majority thereof is sufficient to 
conduct the business of the Commission. [Citations omit ted. ] . . . . 
* * * 
Thus, when four commissioners of the Tax Commission are 
present, three must agree to constitute an act of the Commission. 
When only three are present, two must concur to constitute an act 
of the Commission. If only two participate, whether they agree or 
not, their actions are not those of the Commission because there is 
no quorum. 
The statute and interpretive decisions of the Utah Supreme Court require a quorum of 
the Commission to be present in order to transact business and further require a 
majority of the Commissioners present to constitute an "action" of the Commission. 
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The question then becomes whether or not the Commission's decision, finding that 
Exxonmobil had not persuaded the majority of participating commisioners to 
Exxonmobil's point of view, is an "action" of the Commission that would overturn the 
Division's original, lawful assessment. It is not. 
As noted above, the Division performed its statutory duties by reviewing the 
request for refund and issuing its Statutory Notice denying the request. Had 
Exxonmobil not filed its request for redetermination, that is where the matter would have 
rested. Exxonmobil did, however, file a request for redetermination, in which it asked 
the Commission for affirmative relief. It failed to meet its burden of proof and the 
Division's original action was not, therefore, altered in any way. 
The holding of this Court in E.C. Olson Co. is not inconsistent with the result 
reached by the Commission here. To change the determination reached by the duly 
constituted taxing authority, the Division, a majority of Commissioners (three) had to 
agree with the position argued by Exxonmobil. Exxonmobil failed to persuade a 
majority, but claims it should still have been deemed to have prevailed. Long-standing 
Utah precedent rebuts that argument. In Utah Power & Light Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 590 P. 2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979) the Supreme Court stated: 
Where the taxpayer claims error, it has an obligation, not only to 
show substantial error or impropriety in the assessment, but also to 
provide a sound evidentiary basis upon which the Commission 
could adopt a lower valuation. 
See also Alta Pacific v. Utah State Tax Commission, 931 P. 2d 103, 113 (Utah 1997) 
("[Although Sevier County's assessments, however, did not detail how each of the 
regulatory restraints impacted its assessments, this is not a ground for reversal since 
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the owners' appraisal did no better.") The Court recently addressed the issue in Utah 
Railway Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2000 UT 49, U 10, 5 P.3d 652, where the 
Court observed: 
Where a taxpayer challenges the valuation of property before the 
Commission, the entity defending against the challenge must 
present the available evidence supporting the original valuation. 
Once that is done, the taxpayer, or any other entity seeking an 
adjustment of the original valuation, must meet its twofold burden 
of demonstratingmsubstantial error or impropriety in the [original] 
assessment," and providing "a sound evidentiary basis upon which 
the Commission could adopt a lower valuation." 
5 P.3d at 656. That the Division participates in administrative proceedings in which it 
takes an adverse position to a taxpayer does not destroy the presumption of 
correctness to which it, and all other taxing authorities are entitled when exercising their 
official duties. 
D. The Commission's Determinations Regarding Policy For 
Implementation Of Tax Statutes Is Entitled To A Degree Of 
Deference. 
In its Final Decision, the Commission acknowledged that Exxonmobil had 
presented a reasonable interpretation of when production is completed for purposes of 
imposing the severance tax.1 The Commission went on to note, however, that the 
Division's interpretation was "also a reasonable and permissible definition, is the one 
that has been in use for more than ten years and has been applied consistently with a 
number of similarly situated taxpayers."2 Exxonmobil has cited no authority for the 
Final Decision at 12, R. 291. 
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proposition that when two reasonable interpretations of the same statute are advanced 
- one by the taxing authority entitled to a presumption of correctness and one by a 
taxpayer seeking to lower the amount of its tax - the taxpayer is entitled to prevail when 
it fails to persuade a majority of the taxing authority. The converse is true. 
In Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), this 
Court stated: 
In the absence of a discernible legislative intent concerning 
the specific question in issue, a choice among permissible 
interpretations of a statute is largely a policy determination. 
The agency that has been granted authority to administer 
the statute is the appropriate body to make such a 
determination. Indeed, both the legislative history to section 
63-46b-16 and our prior cases suggest that an appellate 
court should not substitute its judgment for the agency's 
judgment concerning the wisdom of the agency policy. 
Id. at 587-89. See also Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741-42 
(Utah 1977) f[ l]n case of any uncertainty or ambiguity in the statute, a reasonable 
administrative interpretation and practice should be given some weight. This is 
particularly true when such administrative interpretation and practice has persisted for a 
long time without any legislative correction or change.") 
The language at issue here is the term "value at the well," which is the value 
upon which the severance tax is assessed. The Legislature defined "value at the well" 
as meaning the "value of oil or gas at the point production is completed." The oil or gas 
can be sold at the well head, or removed, further refined and sold at another location. 
The value at the well head is lower than the value after the oil or gas is further refined. 
Not surprisingly, the taxpayer would like to pay a tax on the value of the oil and gas at 
the well head. Because the product can be sold there, it may reasonably be said that 
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production is complete and, therefore, Exxonmobil's interpretation is reasonable. 
However, Exxonmobil does not sell its product at the well head. Instead, it further 
refines the product and sells it at a higher price.3 The Commission's long-standing 
policy is to impose the severance tax on the value of the property actually sold. That 
policy and interpretation of the statute is in harmony with the constitutional mandate 
that all property be taxed at a fair and equal rate "according to its value in money." 
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, § 3(1). 
Exxonmobil simply failed to persuade a majority of the Commission that its 
statutory interpretation was more reasonable than the Division, or, more significantly, 
that the Division's interpretation was in error and that the error resulted in some 
prejudice to Exxonmobil.4 
II. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS MANDATE THAT THE COMMISSION'S RULING 
B E AFFIRMED. 
It is well settled that the fundamental purpose for the imposition of taxes upon 
individuals and entities by the government is the funding of public services. The taxation 
system implemented by the Legislature is designed to ensure that "every person and 
3
 Exxonmobil is entitled to deduct certain expenses associated with its 
further refinement of the product. Because UAC's position is not specifically addressed 
to the severance tax, but is addressed to the impact of the proposed shifting of the 
burden of proof, UAC does not address in detail the points raised by Exxonmobil in 
Point III of its brief, which is directed to the relief it requests should the Court find, as it 
should, that Exxonmobil is not the prevailing party under its "tie goes to the taxpayer" 
theory. Those points are ably addressed by the Commission in its responsive brief. 
4
 Indeed, the Commission's Final Decision specifically noted that the 
Division's policy had been uniformly applied to taxpayers similarly situated to 
Exxonmobil over a long period of years. 
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corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property." 
This Court recognized that principle in Robinson v. Hanson, 282 P. 782 (Utah 1929), 
when it noted: 
It is a recognized principle of law that taxes for general 
governmental purposes, lawfully imposed by the state, are 
paramount to all other demands against the taxpayer, 
although the statute imposing the tax does not expressly 
declare such priority. This rule rests upon public policy and 
necessity. Civil government cannot exist or be maintained 
without revenues, and taxes levied by the state for its 
support are founded upon a higher obligation than other 
demands. It is essential to the dignity and power of the 
sovereign state that taxes levied by it be promptly collected 
without fail [Citations omitted]. 
/c/., at 783. 
The question of what happens when a majority of judges in a court of competent 
jurisdiction, or commissioners in an administrative tribunal, cannot agree is not a 
common one, but it is one with legal precedent. In Lee v. State, 517 A.2d 774 
(Maryland Ct. Spec. App. 1986), the court noted that "a conscious non-decision is a 
form, albeit a rare one, of deciding." Id. at 779. The court explained: 
The action of a duly constituted trial court is presumptively 
correct. The appellant, civil or criminal and regardless of his 
posture below, is always the moving party attempting to 
persuade the appellate court that the trial court committed 
error. The burden of proof is, therefore, allocated to the 
party claiming error to prove error. When the moving party 
fails to persuade a majority of the reviewing court that the 
trial court's decision was in error, the appellant has by 
definition failed to sustain his burden of persuasion. The 
presumptive validity of the decision below stands 
un rebutted. 
Id. The Lee court quoted a 1868 decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
support of its conclusion: 
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In cases of appeal or writ of error in this court, the appellant 
or plaintiff in error is always the moving party. It is 
affirmative action which he asks. The question presented is, 
shall the judgment, or decree, be reversed? If the judges 
are divided, the reversal cannot be had, for no order can be 
made. The judgment of the court below, therefore, stands in 
full force. It is indeed, the settled practice in such case to 
enter a judgment of affirmance; but this is only the most 
convenient mode of expressing the fact that the cause is 
finally disposed of in conformity with the action of the court 
below, and that that court can proceed to enforce its 
judgment. The legal effect would be the same if the appeal, 
or writ of error, were dismissed. 
Id. (quoting Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 112 (1898)). Rule 21 is 
consistent with these holdings. 
Exxonmobil's proposed interpretation of Rule 21 would completely alter the 
adversarial system implemented by the Utah Tax Code for resolution of tax disputes by 
essentially eliminating the burden of proof. At the very least, it shifts the burden of 
proof from the taxpayer to the assessing authority and eliminates the presumption of 
validity which attaches to original assessments in tax cases. It is in direct conflict with 
prior decisions of this Court concerning the taxpayer's burden when challenging an 
assessment of the taxpayer's property and is contrary to prior administrative rules.5 
5
 Exxonmobil also argues that it should not be bound by the present version 
of Rule 21. However, because Rule 21 is procedural, not substantive, the rule in effect 
at the time of the formal hearing, not at the time the disputed tax returns were filed by 
Exxonmobil, is applicable. See Pilcher v. Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450, 
455 (Utah 1983) ("procedural statutes enacted subsequent to the initiation of a suit 
which do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights apply not only to 
future actions, but also to accrued and pending actions as well."); State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256, 1267 (Utah 1993) (Standard of review is "a matter of procedural, rather 
than substantive, law."); Board of Equalization v. Utah State Tax Comm'n exrei 
Benchmark, 864 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 1993) (finding that UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1-610 
does not "enlarge, eliminate or destroy" vested or contractual rights and using this 
reasoning to apply section 59-1-610 retroactively.). 
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In this case, Exxonmobil sought a refund of severance taxes which had been 
assessed and paid, but which Exxonmobil alleged had been miscalculated based on 
Exxonmobil's interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-5-101(19). The Division, in the 
exercise of its ordinary statutory duties, reviewed Exxonmobil's request for refund, 
determined that Exxonmobil's calculations were incorrect, based upon the 
Commission's rules and long-standing Division policy and procedure, and issued a 
Statutory Notice denying the requested refund. Appellant's Brief at 7, citing R. at 660 
and 281. The issuance of the Statutory Notice established the value of Exxonmobil's 
property which was subject to the severance tax. In other words, it was an official 
action of a constitutionally and statutorily sanctioned agency in the official exercise of its 
duties. 
At that point, no further action by the Division or any other taxing authority, was 
required to impose or enforce the tax. At that point, it was incumbent upon Exxonmobil 
to file a Request for Redetermination, challenging the Division's Statutory Notice. To 
the same extent that an original assessment is entitled to a presumption of correctness, 
the Division's Statutory Notice denying Exxonmobil's request for refund is entitled to 
that same presumption. 
The presumption of correctness is a necessary component of governmental 
authority. It serves the purpose of finality, in the absence of a timely challenge, for 
budgetary and borrowing purposes. Tax revenue is the source from which 
governmental entities fund necessary public services. It is for that reason that taxing 
authorities are presumed to have conducted themselves in accordance with 
constitutional and statutory mandates and are presumed to have acted correctly. It is 
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for that important purpose that the burden is placed upon the party challenging a 
determination of taxing authorities. Exxonmobil has presented no compelling argument 
for either shifting the burden of proof to the taxing authorities or eliminating the 
presumption that the taxing authorities have acted correctly. 
CONCLUSION 
The presumption of correctness accorded taxing authorities is an important and 
necessary component of the administration of the tax laws in this state and implicates 
the fiscal stability of the state and its various governmental entities. The Court should 
reject Exxonmobil's attempt to eliminate that presumption and shift the burden of proof 
in administrative proceedings before the Tax Commission. The tie should not go to the 
taxpayer. The taxpayer must persuade the Commission to obtain the relief it requests. 
For these reasons, the decision of the Commission should be affirmed. 
DATED this ' * - day of May, 2003. 
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Attorneys for the Utah Association of Counties 
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